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Abstract	
Flow-based	 intrusion	 detection	 systems	 analyze	 IP	 flow	 records	 to	 detect	 attacks	against	 computer	 networks.	 IP	 flow	 records	 contain	 aggregated	 information	 of	network	 traffic	 packets	 therefore	 the	 amount	 of	 data	 processed	 by	 the	 intrusion	detection	system	is	reduced.	However,	flow-based	techniques	are	not	mature	enough	and	 combined	 with	 payload	 based	 techniques	 in	 a	 multi-stage	 intrusion	 detection	system.	The	first	stage	in	the	multi-stage	intrusion	detection	system	uses	flow-based	detection	to	identify	potentially	malicious	traffic.	The	malicious	traffic	is	forwarded	to	a	second	stage	where	detail	intrusion	detection	is	performed	using	payload	inspection.	Since	there	is	only	one	class	of	interest	(malicious)	at	the	first	stage,	we	propose	a	one-class	 classification	 model	 for	 detection	 of	 malicious	 flows.	 The	 one-class	 classifier	detects	 malicious	 flows	 from	 the	 network	 traffic.	 We	 review	 various	 one-class	classification	techniques	and	evaluate	them	on	a	flowbased	dataset	to	determine	their	performance	 for	 detection	 of	 malicious	 flows.	 Our	 results	 show	 that	 one-class	classification	 techniques	 using	 boundary	 methods	 give	 best	 results	 in	 detection	 of	malicious	IP	flows.	
Keywords:	 Intrusion	detection,	IP	flows,	One-class	classification.	
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1. Introduction	
Intrusion	detection	systems	(IDS)	secure	computer	networks	 from	unauthorized	access	and	cyber	attacks.	The	intrusion	detection	systems	analyze	network	traffic	and	raise	an	alert	 if	an	attack	is	detected.	Traditional	approaches	for	intrusion	detection	uses	payload	and	protocol	based	inspection.	Payload-based	inspection	techniques	scan	complete	 packet	 payload	 to	 detect	 attacks	 and	 have	 full	 access	 to	 network	 traffic.	However,	payload	inspection	can	slow	down	network	traffic	in	high-speed	backbone	links	(Husak	et	al.,	2015).	Also,	payload	inspection	is	not	possible	when	packet	content	is	encrypted.	Protocol-based	techniques	check	header	fields	of	every	packet	against	the	protocol	specification.	Any	out	of	range	value	in	protocol	fields	of	the	packet	header	is	considered	malicious.	Protocol	inspection	techniques	are	protocol	specific	and	cannot	be	generalized	for	unknown	protocols.	An	 alternative	 approach	 to	 payload	 and	 protocol	 inspection	 is	 the	 flow-based	inspection.	Flow-based	inspection	uses	IP	flow	records	for	intrusion	detection.	An	IP	flow	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 set	 of	 IP	 packets	 passing	 through	 an	 observation	 point	 in	 the	network	during	a	certain	time	interval.	All	packets	belonging	to	a	particular	flow	have	a	set	of	common	properties	(Claise	et	al.,	2013).	A	flow	export	and	collection	protocol	collects	flow	data	from	the	network.	The	flow	export	and	collection	protocol	makes	the	IP	flow	records	available	to	a	flow	analysis	application	in	the	desired	format.	A	common	flow	 export	 protocol	 is	 Cisco’s	 Netflow,	 which	 is	 supported	 by	 almost	 all	 major	vendors.	 Internet	 Engineering	 Task	 Force	 (IETF)	 adopted	 Netflow’s	 version	 9	 and	standardized	it	as	IP	Flow	Information	Exchange	(IPFIX)	protocol	(Sperotto	and	Pras,	2011).	IPFIX	specifies	a	standard	architecture	for	collection	and	processing	of	IP	flow	records.	
Flow-based	intrusion	detection	systems	have	several	advantages	over	payload	and	protocol-based	techniques	(Golling	et	al.,	2014).	Flow-based	approaches	only	inspect	the	 packet	 headers	 and	 do	 not	 consume	 any	 resources	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 packet	payloads.	Since	no	payload	inspection	is	involved,	flow-based	intrusion	detection	is	not	affected	by	the	use	of	encryption.	IP	flows	contain	aggregate	information	in	the	form	of	IP	 flows	 therefore	 flow-based	 inspection	 does	 not	 inspect	 ever	 packet	 header	 or	payload.	 IP	 flow	 records	 are	 independent	of	 the	higher	 layer	protocols.	 Flow-based	techniques	also	have	some	disadvantages.	These	systems	only	rely	on	the	header	fields	
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and	have	no	access	to	relevant	 information	residing	 in	packet	payloads.	Flow-based	detection	systems	are	therefore	unable	to	detect	attacks	which	are	hidden	in	packet	payload	and	do	not	cause	a	significant	change	in	traffic	flow	data.	Also	the	flow	export	and	collection	process	involve	a	certain	delay	in	intrusion	detection	during	which	slow	and	small	ramped	attacks	can	go	undetected	(Vykopal	et	al.,	2013).	Researchers	have,	therefore,	suggested	multi-stage	intrusion	detection	models	which	combine	flow	and	payload	 based	 intrusion	 detection	 processes	 (	 Sperotto	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Golling	 et	 al.,	2014).	Flow-based	 intrusion	 detection	 is	 combined	 with	 payload-based	 detection	techniques	(	Golling	et	al.,	2014).	The	flow-based	detection	 is	performed	at	 the	 first	stage	 while	 detail	 analysis	 is	 performed	 at	 second	 stage	 using	 payload-based	inspection.	In	this	paper,	we	propose	a	one-class	classification	model	for	flow-based	detection	 of	 malicious	 traffic.	 One-class	 classification	 is	 employed	 when	 labeled	training	data	is	available	for	only	one	class.	Training	data	for	other	classes	is	either	not	available	 or	 difficult	 to	 obtain	 (Khan	 and	 Madden,	 2014).	 The	 class	 for	 which	 the	training	examples	are	available	is	called	target	class.	The	focus	of	our	work	is	to	apply	one-class	classification	for	detection	of	malicious	flows.	We	also	evaluate	various	one-class	classification	techniques	on	a	flow-based	dataset	to	determine	their	performance	in	flow-based	intrusion	detection.	The	training	dataset	contains	malicious	IP	flows	and	test	 dataset	 contains	 both	 normal	 and	malicious	 flows.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 results,	 we	discuss	the	application	of	available	one-class	classification	techniques	for	flow-based	detection	of	malicious	traffic.	The	organization	of	the	paper	is	as	follows:	Section	2	presents	existing	work	on	the	use	of	one-class	classification	techniques	for	intrusion	detection.	Section	3	describes	the	 concept	 of	 one	 class	 classification	 and	 reviews	 various	 one-class	 classification	methods.	 In	section	4,	we	propose	one-class	classification	for	detection	of	malicious	flow	in	the	first	stage	of	a	multi-stage	intrusion	detection	system.	We	evaluate	different	one-class	classification	techniques	on	a	flow-based	dataset	and	discuss	the	results	in	section	5.	Finally,	the	conclusion	and	future	work	are	presented	in	section	6.	
2. Related	Work	
Machine	 learning	 algorithms	 have	 remained	 in	 primary	 focus	 for	 designing	intrusion	detection	systems	(Liao	et	al.,	2013).	Similarly,	one-class	classification	has	
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also	been	applied	to	solve	the	intrusion	detection	problem.	An	ensemble	of	one-class	classifiers	 for	 intrusion	detection	 is	proposed	 in	 (Giacinto	et	al.,	2008).	The	authors	have	 used	 a	 modular	 approach	 in	 which	 each	 module	 models	 a	 group	 of	 similar	network	protocols	and	services.	Parzen	density	estimation,	k-means,	and	v-SVM	are	used	 to	 construct	 the	 one-class	 classifier	 ensemble.	 The	 technique	 is	 evaluated	 on	KDD99	 dataset	 and	 results	 show	 that	 dividing	 the	 problem	 into	 different	modules	attains	high	detection	rates	with	lower	false	alarm	rates.	A	flow-based	intrusion	detection	system	using	one-class	SVM	classification	is	used	in	 (	Winter	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	OC-SVM	detects	malicious	 flows	 and	 discards	 normal	flows.	A	small	subset	of	the	flow-based	dataset,	developed	by	Sperotto	et	al.	(2009),	is	used	for	evaluation.	A	differential	support	vector	data	descriptor	(SVDD)	based	one-class	classification	method	 to	 detect	 more	 harmful	 attacks	 using	 host-based	 intrusion	 detection	 is	proposed	 in	 (Kang	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Experimental	 results	 show	 that	 differentiated	intrusion	detection	method	performs	better	than	existing	techniques	for	detection	of	harmful	attacks.	An	 application	 of	 one-class	 classification	 for	 intrusion	 detection	 in	 Supervisory	Control	and	Data	Acquisition	(SCADA)	networks	is	presented	in	(Nader	et	al.,	2013).	SCADA	networks	monitor	and	control	industrial	and	public	service	processes	such	as	nuclear	 power	 plants,	 electrical	 power	 grids,	 gas	 pipelines	 and	 water	 distribution	systems.	The	authors	have	employed	two	one-classification	methods;	Support	Vector	Data	 Description	 (SVDD)	 (Tax,	 2001)	 and	 Kernel	 Principal	 Component	 Analysis	(Hoffmann,	 2007).	 Both	 techniques	 used	 a	 SCADA	 network	 dataset	 for	 evaluation.	Results	indicate	that	both	techniques	tightly	enclose	the	normal	flow	behavior	in	the	SVM	hyper-sphere	and	also	detect	intrusions.	Amer	et	al.	(2013)	proposed	two	enhancements	in	one-class	SVM	for	unsupervised	anomaly	detection.	Both	enhancements	reduce	the	effect	of	outliers	on	the	SVM	model	during	 training.	 Authors	 have	 compared	 the	 proposed	 techniques	 with	 nine	 other	unsupervised	anomaly	detection	algorithms	and	obtained	promising	results.	An	 industrial	 communication	 intrusion	 detection	 algorithm	 based	 on	 one-class	SVM	 is	 presented	 in	 (Shang	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Authors	 have	 used	 particle	 swarm	optimization	(Couceiro	and	Ghamisi,	2016)	to	tune	the	kernel	parameters.	
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A	robust	one-class	SVM	for	outlier	detection	is	presented	in	(Yang	et	al.,	2016).	The	authors	use	dynamic	weight	assignment	for	training	datasets	for	the	smooth	influence	on	one-class	SVM.	Experimental	analysis	 shows	 the	proposed	weighted	method	has	improved	 performance	 and	 robustness	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 conventional	 one-class	SVM.	Survey	of	literature	shows	that	although	one-class	classification	has	been	in	use	for	intrusion	 detection,	 there	 are	 many	 other	 one-classification	 techniques	 yet	 to	 be	explored	in	detail	for	flow-based	intrusion	detection.	
3. One-class	classification	
One-class	classification	is	a	particular	case	of	binary	classification	which	recognizes	examples	 of	 only	 one	 class.	 The	 one-class	 classification	 is	 useful	 when	 training	examples	of	only	one	class	is	available.	Training	sample	for	other	classes	is	either	not	available	or	difficult	to	obtain	(	Khan	and	Madden,	2014).	The	class	for	which	training	samples	 are	 available	 is	 called	 a	 target	 class.	 An	 important	 application	 of	 one-class	classification	is	intrusion	detection	where	target	class	is	malicious	category	of	network	traffic.	 The	 one-class	 classification	based	 intrusion	detection	only	detects	malicious	traffic	and	discards	the	normal	traffic.	Mathematically,	 we	 assume	 that	 xi	 is	 an	 training	 example	 from	 the	 target	 class	dataset	X	=	{x1,x2,x3,...,xn}.	The	one-class	classifier	uses	the	training	dataset	X	to	learn	a	model	with	 the	optimized	parameter	set	θ.	After	 learning,	 the	classifier	can	 identify	target	 class	 examples	 from	 unseen	 test	 dataset	 Z.	 The	 classifier	 defines	 an	 output	function	f	using	the	optimized	parameter	set	θ	such	that:	
f(zi,θ)	=	ci	 	 	 (1)	Where	zi	is	an	unseen	example,	and	ci	is	the	class	probability.	The	classifier	uses	a	mapping	function	h(zi)	over	the	output	function	f(zi)	to	classify	unseen	examples	into	target	or	outlier	classes.	If	the	class	probability	is	higher	than	a	pre-defined	threshold	
t,	the	target	class	is	selected	otherwise	the	example	is	declared	outlier.	
	 	 (2)	
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Available	one-class	classification	techniques	include	density	estimation	methods,	boundary	methods	and	reconstruction	methods	(Tax,	2001;	Mazhelis,	2006).	
3.1.	Density	Estimation	The	density	estimation	methods	calculate	the	density	of	target	class	from	training	data	using	a	density	estimation	function	f(z).	The	function	f(z)	calculates	the	density	of	a	test	example	and	uses	a	threshold	value	to	accept	the	example	in	the	target	class.	If	the	density	of	test	example	is	higher	than	the	threshold,	it	is	classified	into	target	class.	Otherwise,	 the	 example	 is	 considered	 an	 outlier	 (Pimentel	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 We	 have	evaluated	 three	 desntiy	 estimation	 methods;	 simple	 Gaussian	 distribution	 using	Mahalanobis	distance,	mixture	of	Gaussian	and	Parzen	distribution.	
3.1.1.	Simple	Gaussian	distribution	using	Mahalanobis	distance	This	 technique	 uses	 the	 Mahalanobis	 distance	 to	 calculate	 the	 density	 of	 test	example	z	in	the	Gaussian	distribution:	
f(z)	=	(z	−	µ)T	Σ−1(z	−	µ)	 	 (3)	where	µ	is	the	mean	and	Σ	is	the	covariance	matrix.	
3.1.2.	 Mixture	of	Gaussian	The	 simple	Gaussian	distribution	does	not	 fit	most	data	distributions.	To	model	more	 complex	 data,	 a	mixture	 of	 different	Gaussian	 distribution	 is	 used.	Density	 at	point	z	for	mixture	of	different	Gaussian	distributions	is	defined	using	the	following	equation:	
Where	Pi	is	the	probability	that	z	belongs	to	ith	Gaussian	component,	µi	is	the	mean	and	Σ	is	the	covariance	matrix.	
3.1.3.	Parzen	Distribution	Parzen	density	 estimation	uses	 a	hypercube	<	with	dimension	d	and	width	h	 to	calculate	 the	 density	 at	 point	 z.	 The	 hypercube	 <	 is	 centered	 at	 z	 and	 density	 is	
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calculated	with	respect	to	all	examples	xi.	We	define	a	function	φ	which	gives	a	value	of	1	if	an	example	xi	is	within	the	hypercube	<	or	0	otherwise.	
)	 	 	 	 (6)	
We	use	Gaussian	estimate	for	the	function	f(z)	such	that:	
3.2.	
Reconstruction	methods	Reconstruction	methods	use	training	dataset	to	model	the	generating	process	for	all	examples.	A	reconstruction	error	is	used	to	measure	the	fit	of	an	actual	example	for	the	generating	model.	If	the	example	does	not	fit	the	model	and	reconstruction	error	is	high,	 the	 example	 is	 more	 likely	 an	 outlier	 (Pimentel	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Reconstruction	methods	 include	 neural	 networks	 (Auto-encoder	 neural	 networks,	 self-organizing	map)	and	subspace-based	approaches	(Principle	Component	Analysis).	
3.2.1.	Auto-encoder	Neural	Networks	The	auto-encoder	neural	networks	encodes	the	 input	to	pass	through	a	compact	hidden	stage.	The	input	is	reconstructed	(decoded)	at	the	output	stage	and	matched	with	original	input	to	calculate	the	reconstruction	error:	
f(z)	=	||z	−	zrecons||2		 	(8)	
3.2.2.	Self-organizing	map	Self-organizing	maps	is	a	clustering	technique	where	high	dimension	input	space	is	mapped	 to	 low	 dimension	 output	 clusters.	 The	 self-organizing	 map	 has	 input	 and	output	layers	which	connect	with	each	other	through	a	competitive	learning	network.	The	output	layer	contains	all	clusters.	An	unseen	example	is	placed	at	the	output	layer	and	 the	 distance	 from	 the	 closest	 cluster	 center	 is	 calculated.	 The	 distance	 is	reconstruction	error	defined	by:	
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f(z)	=	mink||z	−	µk||2	 (9)	
where	k	is	number	of	output	clusters.	
3.2.3.	Principle	Component	Analysis	The	Principle	component	analysis	(PCA)	is	dimension	reduction	technique	which	maps	the	input	space	of	size	N	to	output	space	M	such	that	M	<	N.	The	projection	of	input	object	z	from	N	to	M	is	defined	by:	
y	=	WWT	z	 (10)	where	W	is	k	×	d	matrix	storing	eigenvector	for	output	space,	d	=	N.	PCA	use	 the	reconstruction	error	as	a	classification	 function.	The	reconstruction	error	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 squared	 distance	 between	 the	 projection	 and	 the	 original	example:	
f(z)	=	||z	−	y||2	 (11)	
3.3.	Boundary	Methods	Boundary	methods	construct	a	boundary	around	 the	 target	 class	examples	 such	that	 most	 of	 the	 target	 examples	 lie	 within	 the	 boundary.	 These	 methods	 use	 a	threshold	value	for	acceptance	of	outliers	within	the	boundary.	An	unseen	example	z	belongs	to	target	class	if	it	lies	within	the	boundary.	We	have	used	ν-Support	Vector	Machine(SVM)	 (Schcolkopf	 et	 al.,	 2001)	 and	 Support	 Vector	 Data	 Descriptors	 (Tax,	2001)	for	evaluation	of	IP	flows	records.	
3.3.1.	ν-	SVM	The	ν-SVM	construct	a	boundary	around	the	target	class	examples	in	the	form	of	a	hyper-plane	during	training	(Sch¨olkopf	et	al.,	2001).	An	unseen	example	z	belong	to	target	class	if	it	falls	within	the	hyper-plane	and	considered	outlier	otherwise.	SVM	uses	a	feature	mapping	function	φ	:	X	→	H	which	maps	the	input	feature	space	
X	to	a	high	dimension	feature	space	H	(Li,	2015).	The	similarity	between	an	input	x	and	its	class	prediction	y	in	feature	space	H	is	be	calculated	using	a	simple	kernel	function:	
K(x,y)	=	(φ(x).φ(y))H	 (12)	
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To	 separate	 the	 input	 examples	 from	 the	 origin	with	maximum	margin	 using	 a	hyper-plane,	following	quadratic	minimizing	function	is	applied:	
(13)	
Subject	to	 	(w.φ(xi))	≥	ρ	−	ξi,ξi	≥	0	 (14)	where	ξi	:	Slack	variable	to	penalize	the	outliers	ν	∈	(0,1)	:	A	user-defined	error	control	parameter	and	sets	an	upper	bound	on	the	fraction	of	outliers	and	a	lower	bound	on	the	number	of	support	vectors.	
ρ	:	The	maximal	margin	for	hyper-plane	from	origin.	Using	Lagrange	multipliers	and	constructing	a	Lagrangian,	the	decision	function	for	the	classification	of	a	test	example	z	is	defined	as	follows	(Sch¨olkopf	et	al.,	2001):	
	
3.3.2.	Support	Vector	Data	Descriptor(SVDD)	The	support	vector	data	descriptors	construct	a	hyper-sphere	around	 the	 target	class	training	examples.	The	sphere	has	its	center	a	with	radius	R	>	0.	The	volume	of	the	 sphere	 is	 minimized	 such	 that	 it	 contains	 all	 training	 examples	 (Tax,	 2001).	Following	error	function	is	minimized	for	SVDD:	
F(R,a)	=	R2	Such	that	all	target	examples	xi	lies	within	the	sphere:	
(16)	
||xi	−	a||2	≤	R2	 (17)	The	strict	data	description	of	minimizing	the	sphere	radius	may	not	fit	in	all	cases.	To	allow	the	possibility	of	outliers	in	the	sphere,	and	to	penalize	the	larger	distances	for	xi,	slack	variables	are	introduced.	Thus,	the	minimization	problem	becomes:	
Such	that	maximum	target	examples	xi	lies	within	the	sphere:	||xi	−	a||2	≤	R2	+	ξi,ξi	≥	0	 (19)	
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The	C	parameter	is	analogues	to	ν	in	ν-SVM	and	control	the	acceptable	number	of	outliers.The	parameters	R,	a,	and	ξ	are	optimized	by	using	Lagrange	multipliers	and	constructing	a	Lagrangian.	We	have	following	quadratic	minimization	problem	(Tax,	2001):	
A	test	example	z	is	classified	into	target	class	if	its	distance	from	center	a	is	less	than	the	radius	of	the	sphere.	The	decision	function	for	classification	is	defined	as	follows:	
	
4. Proposed	approach	
Both	 payload	 and	 flow	 based	 techniques	 have	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	associated	with	them	(Golling	et	al.,	2014).	However,	flow-based	techniques	are	not	yet	a	 replacement	 of	 payloadbased	 inspection.	 Flow-based	 techniques	 do	 not	 carry	 the	payload;	 therefore,	 accurate	 detection	 of	 attack	 is	 difficult.	 Flow-based	 identify	 the	behavior	and	communication	pattern	of	various	attacks	threats.	An	anomaly	detection	algorithm	evaluates	these	patterns	to	detect	an	intrusion	(	Sperotto	et	al.,	2010).	A	two-stage	intrusion	detection	model	using	both	flow	and	payload-based	detection	has	been	proposed	by	Golling	et	al.	(2014);	Sperotto	et	al.	(2010).	The	flow-based	detection	is	performed	 at	 the	 first	 stage.	 The	 suspicious	 traffic	 identified	 at	 the	 first	 stage	 is	forwarded	 to	 the	second	stage.	The	second	stage	uses	packet	 inspection	 to	perform	detail	 intrusion	detection.	 In	 this	model,	 the	 flow-based	detection	 stage	detects	 the	suspicious	 traffic	without	 performing	 the	 complex	 and	 resource-consuming	 task	 of	packet	content	 inspection.	The	deep	content	 inspection	is	only	performed	at	second	stage	for	the	traffic	which	is	marked	malicious	and	not	on	the	total	network	traffic.	
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Figure	1:	A	two-stage	intrusion	detection	model	using	one-class	classification	for	flow-based	inspection	
	In	this	paper,	we	propose	a	one-class	classification	model	for	flow-based	detection	in	 the	 twostage	 intrusion	 detection	 process.	 The	 one-class	 classifier	 only	 identifies	malicious	traffic	and	raises	an	alert	if	an	attack	is	detected.	The	malicious	flows	are	also	forwarded	to	the	second	stage	detection	process	which	uses	payload	based	inspection	for	detail	intrusion	detection	Figure	 1	 describes	 the	 architecture	 of	 our	 approach.	 The	 one-class	 learning	algorithm	is	a	supervised	algorithm	and	uses	a	set	of	malicious	IP	flows	for	training.	After	training,	the	flowbased	intrusion	detection	system	is	provided	with	the	IP	flow	traffic	for	detection	of	malicious	activity.	A	flow	export	and	collection	protocol	collect	IP	 flows	 from	 the	 network	 and	 stores	 them	 in	 a	 flow	database.	 The	pre-processing	stage	selects	 IP	 flow	from	the	database	and	converts	 them	flow	records	 in	a	 format	accepted	by	the	one-class	learning	algorithm.	The	one-class	classifier	evaluates	every	flow	 and	 separates	 malicious	 flows	 from	 normal	 network	 traffic.	 One	 detection	 of	malicious	flows,	it	raises	an	alert	and	forwards	malicious	IP	flows	to	the	second	stage	of	 intrusion	 detection.	 The	 second	 stage	 detection	 process	 can	 use	 deep-packet	inspection	to	extract	additional	 information	about	the	suspicious	activity.	The	detail	intrusion	 detection	 can	 involve	 exploring	 of	 types	 attacks	 and	 victim	 services.	 The	
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intrusion	detection	system	raises	an	alert	after	the	second	stage	detection	process	is	completed.	The	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	evaluate	the	application	of	one	classification	for	flow-based	intrusion	detection.	We	consider	various	one-classification	methods	including	density	 estimation,	 reconstruction	methods	and	boundary	methods	 for	detection	of	malicious	IP	flows.	We	evaluate	the	one-class	classification	techniques	on	a	flow-based	dataset	and	obtain	results	to	determine	the	suitable	one-class	classification	technique	for	detection	of	malicious	IP	flows.	
5. Experimental	Results	
5.1.	Dataset	We	 have	 used	 two	 scenarios	 of	 CTU-13	 dataset	 for	 evaluation	 of	 one-class	classification	 techniques.	The	CTU-13	dataset	was	 created	 in	CTU	University,	 Czech	Republic	(Garcia	et	al.,	2014).	The	dataset	consists	of	botnet	traffic	mixed	with	normal	and	 background	 communication	 traffic.	 The	 traffic	 capture	 process	 consists	 of	 13	different	scenarios	where	a	particular	malware	traffic	was	captured	in	each	scenario.	The	environment	for	traffic	capture	consists	of	virtual	machines	running	the	Microsoft	Windows	 XP	 SP2	 operating	 system	 on	 top	 of	 a	 Linux	 Debian	 host.	 These	 virtual	machines	were	bridged	into	the	University	network.	The	traffic	was	captured	both	on	the	 Linux	 host	 and	 on	 the	 university	 network	 router	 connected	 to	 the	 Linux	 host.	During	 the	 labeling	process,	 all	 traffic	was	 initially	 given	 the	background	 label.	The	normal	label	was	given	to	the	traffic	that	was	originated	from	switches,	proxies,	and	legitimate	 computers.	 All	 traffic	 that	 came	 from	 the	 known	 infected	machines	was	labeled	botnet.	We	have	used	fourth	and	first	scenario	for	the	experiment.	Table	1	gives	detail	of	the	malware	and	traffic	flow	records	in	each	scenario.	The	CTU	dataset	contains	bidirectional	Netflow	records.	Every	flow	record	has	15	attributes.	Table	2	shows	a	sample	of	the	dataset	with	important	attributes.	The	start	time	and	duration	 fields	are	used	 to	calculate	 the	 flow	duration.	The	protocol	value	shows	the	transport	layer	protocol	type.	The	direction	field	shows	the	direction	of	flow.	It	can	be	incoming,	outgoing	or	bi-directional.	The	Total	packets	and	total	bytes	fields	contain	the	total	number	of	packets	and	bytes	transmitted	in	either	direction.	Another	field	source	bytes	also	exists	which	can	be	used	to		
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Table	2:	Important	flow	attributes	-	CTU-13	intrusion	dataset	Duration	 Protocol	 Src.	Addr	 Src	Port	 Dst.	Addr	 Dst	Port	 Total	Packets	 Total	Bytes	 Src.	Bytes	 Label	3550.1823	 udp	 212.50.71.179	 39678	 147.32.84.229	 13363	 12	 875	 413	 normal	0.0008	 udp	 84.13.246.132	 28431	 147.32.84.229	 13363	 2	 135	 75	 normal	0.0003	 tcp	 217.163.21.35	 80	 147.32.86.194	 2063	 2	 120	 60	 normal	0.0569	 tcp	 83.3.77.74	 32882	 147.32.85.5	 21857	 3	 180	 120	 normal	3427.7680	 udp	 74.89.223.204	 21278	 147.32.84.229	 13363	 42	 2856	 1596	 normal	3086.5473	 tcp	 66.169.184.207	 49372	 147.32.84.229	 13363	 591	 45931	26480	normal	extract	the	bytes	received	from	the	destination.	The	label	field	shows	the	type	of	flow.	We	have	extracted	a	 sample	of	 the	dataset	 for	 evaluation	of	 one-class	 classification	techniques.	Detail	of	IP	flows	in	the	sample	are	given	on	Table	3.	
5.2.	Performance	Measures	We	 have	 evaluated	 one-class	 classification	 techniques	 using	 two	 well-known	performance	 measures;	 Area	 under	 Receiver	 Operating	 Characteristic	 (ROC)	 curve	(AUC)	and	F1	score	(Wu	and	Banzhaf,	2010).	The	ROC	curve	plots	the	false	alarm	rate	against	 true	positive	rate.	 In	 intrusion	detection,	ROC	curve	measures	 the	detection	rate	as	the	false	alarm	threshold	varies.	The	ROC	curve	is	quantified	by	measuring	the	area	 under	 the	 curve	 (AUC).	 The	 value	 of	 AUC	 near	 1	 denotes	 a	 good	 intrusion	detection	process.	The	second	performance	measure	 is	F1	score.	F1	score	 is	equal	 to	 the	harmonic	mean	of	precision	and	recall	values:	
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Table	4:	Results	for	one-class	classification	of	malicious	IP	flows	One-class	Classification	Technique	 Area	under	ROC	Curve	 Precision	 Recall	 F1	score	
Density	Estimation	 	 	 	 	Simple	Gaussian	 0.8709	 0.3763	 0.9957	 0.5461	Mixture	of	Gaussian	 0.9024	 0.4145	 0.9561	 0.5773	Parzen	density	estimation	
Reconstruction	Methods	 0.952	 0.5244	 0.0.9336	 0.6715	Auto-encoder	Neural	Network	 0.905	 1.0	 0.3604	 0.5298	Self	Organizing	Maps	 0.7549	 0.1306	 0.9785	 0.2304	Principle	Component	Analysis	
Boundary	Methods	 0.9288	 0.1299	 0.9957	 0.2298	
ν-SVM	 0.9297	 0.9103	 0.9125	 0.9114	Support	Vector	Data	Descriptor	(SVDD)	 0.9335	 0.9258	 0.8953	 0.9102	
5.3.	Results	We	 have	 used	Matlab,	Weka,	 DDtools	 (Tax,	 2015)	 and	 LibSVM	 (Chang	 and	 Lin,	2011)	for	performing	the	experiment.	Table	4	gives	detail	results	for	various	one-class	classification	techniques	using	multiple	performance	measures.	During	evaluation	of	density	estimation	methods,	the	simple	Gaussian	gives	a	value	of	0.8709	and	0.5461	for	AUC	and	F1	score	respectively.	The	ROC	curve	of	simple	Gaussian	is	shown	in	Figure	2a.	Mixture	of	Gaussian	shows	little	improvement	with	AUC	of	0.9024	(Figure	2b)	and	
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F1	score	of	0.5773.	The	Parzen	density	estimate	has	AUC	of	0.952	(Figure	2c)	and	F1	score	of	0.6715.	Reconstruction	methods	give	average	results	for	one-class	classification.	The	auto-encoder	neural	network	shows	better	performance	with	AUC	of	0.905	(Figure	2d)	and	F1	score	of	0.5298.	The	AUC	for	self-organizing	map	(SOM)	is	0.7549	(Figure	2e)	and	F1	score	is	0.2304.	The	Principle	component	analysis	(PCA)	has	AUC	of	0.9288	(Figure	2f)	and	F1	score	of	0.2298.	One-class	classification	using	boundary	methods	gives	best	results	in	detection	of	malicious	IP	flows.	The	ν-SVM	has	AUC	of	0.9297	(Figure	3a)	and	F1	score	of	0.9114.	The	support	vector	data	descriptor	(SVDD)	also	has	similar	results	with	AUC	of	0.9288	(Figure	3b)	and	F1	score	of	0.2298.	
5.4.	Discussion	In	 the	 first	 step,	 we	 have	 evaluated	 one-class	 classifiers	 techniques	 based	 on	density	 estimation	 methods.	 The	 performance	 of	 density	 methods	 depends	 on	 the	correct	estimation	of	 the	density	 function.	These	 techniques	give	good	results	 if	 the	data	 is	well-sampled	and	a	 large	 training	dataset	 is	 available.	However,	 the	density	functions	do	not	give	accurate	results	if	data	is	sparsely	plotted	in	the	feature	space.	Due	to	this	 limitation,	these	techniques	do	not	have	good	performance	for	one-class	classification.	 Our	 results	 also	 show	 that	 density	 based	 approaches	 have	 lower	performance	 for	 one-class	 classification	 of	malicious	 IP	 flows.	 The	 simple	 Gaussian	method	has	lower	accuracy	because	IP	flow	records	and	other	data	distributions	do	not	fit	in	the	bell	curve	of	Gaussian	representation.	The	constraint	of	a	single	bell	curve	is	 relaxed	 by	 using	 a	 mixture	 of	 Gaussian	 distributions.	 The	 mixture	 of	 Gaussian	combine	 multiple	 Gaussian	 representations	 and	 also	 shows	 some	 improvement	 in	results.	However,	still	the	mixture	of	Gaussian	model	is	not	an	accurate	representation	of	 IP	 flows	 traffic	 distribution.	 The	 Parzen	 density	 method	 shows	 improved	performance	among	all	density	estimation	techniques.	Parzen	density	
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Figure	2:	ROC	curves	for	density	and	reconstruction	methods	one-class	classification	techniques	
(	a	)	Simple	 Gaussian	 (	b	)	Mixture	 of	Gaussian		
(	c	)	Parzen	 Distribution	 (	d	)	Auto-encoder	 Neural	Network		
(	e	)	Self-organizing	 Maps	 (	f	)	Principle	 Component	 Analysis		
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Figure	3:	ROC	curves	for	boundary	methods	one-class	classification	techniques	
estimation	 requires	 all	 training	data	 to	 be	made	 available	 during	 testing	 (Mazhelis,	2006).	This	 is	particularly	 challenging	 in	 the	case	of	 intrusion	detection	 in	network	traffic	where	large	training	records	are	pushed	on	regular	intervals.	In	next	step,	the	one-class	classifier	based	on	reconstruction	methods	have	been	evaluated.	The	reconstruction	methods	use	a	generating	process	to	model	the	data.	The	parameters	of	the	generating	process	are	optimized	for	the	correct	representation	of	new	 objects.	 Although	 reconstruction	 methods	 can	 be	 applied	 for	 one-class	classification	 problems,	 they	 are	 not	 primarily	 meant	 for	 this	 purpose	 (Tax,	 2001;	Wozniak,	2014).	In	case	the	data	does	not	fit	the	model,	a	bias	value	is	used	to	minimize	the	reconstruction	error.	The	bias	value	destroys	the	important	characteristics	of	the	dataset	 (Tax,	 2001).	 Accurate	 modeling	 of	 IP	 flow	 records	 using	 reconstruction	methods	 requires	 a	 large	 number	 of	 parameter	 to	 be	 optimized	 and	 can	 have	 high	reconstruction	 error.	 These	 methods	 are	 computationally	 expensive	 for	 one	 class	classification	 (Mazhelis,	 2006).	Another	 drawback	 of	 reconstruction	methods	 is	 the	difficulty	in	training	high-dimensional	spaces	(Pimentel	et	al.,	2014).	This	aspect	limit	the	use	of	reconstruction	methods	for	classification	of	IP	flows	because	flow	records	can	be	very	high	dimensional	as	IPFIX	includes	around	280	attributes	to	define	an	IP	flow	record.	In	next	experiment,	we	have	applied	two	neural	network	approaches	which	include	auto-encoder	neural	network	and	self-organizing	map.	Results	show	that	auto-encoder	neural	network	has	relatively	good	accuracy,	but	 it	requires	some	parameters	to	be	
(	a	)	ν	-	SVM	 (	b	)	Support	 Vector	 Data	 Descriptor		
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specified	 by	 the	 user.	 These	 include	 the	 number	 of	 hidden	 layers,	 input	 units,	 and	stopping	criteria	(Mazhelis,	2006).	The	auto-encoder	neural	network	also	needs	a	large	training	set	for	correct	estimation	of	weights	associated	with	hidden	and	input	units.	The	 self-organizing	 map	 (SOM)	 requires	 the	 user	 to	 specify	 the	 number	 of	 output	clusters.	 Also	 SOM	 needs	 kd	 neurons	 for	 d	 dimension	 dataset.	 It	 is	 computational	expensive	to	estimate	the	weights	of	kd	neurons	if	both	k	and	d	are	moderately	higher	(Tax,	2001).	Another	type	of	reconstruction	method	is	Principle	component	analysis	(PCA).	PCA	also	has	 lower	accuracy	 for	one-class	classification	of	 IP	 flows.	The	PCA	does	not	perform	well	if	the	data	has	variance	in	all	feature	direction.	In	this	case,	PCA	is	unable	to	reduce	the	dimensionality	of	data	(Tax,	2001).	One-class	classification	techniques	using	boundary	methods	give	best	results	for	identification	of	malicious	 IP	 flows.	 The	 boundary	methods	 are	 specifically	 focused	 on	 one-class	classification	 and	 also	 perform	 better	 if	 limited	 training	 sample	 is	 available	 (Tax,	2001).	These	methods	avoid	 the	estimation	of	 the	complete	probability	density	and	can	work	efficiently	if	the	dataset	is	high	dimensional.	In	our	experiment,	we	have	used	two	 SVM-based	one	 class	 classification	 techniques;	ν-SVM	and	 Support	Vector	Data	Descriptor	 (SVDD).	 The	 ν-SVM	 and	 SVDD	 use	 hyperplane	 and	 hypersphere	respectively	 to	 enclose	 the	 target	 class	 examples.	 Finding	 the	 smallest	 sphere	containing	all	target	points	is	equivalent	to	find	the	segment	containing	the	required	points	(Sch¨olkopf	et	al.,	2001).	In	our	experiment,	both	methods	show	similar	result	and	perform	better	than	all	reviewed	classification	methods.	However,	a	drawback	of	SVM-based	 methods	 is	 the	 difficulty	 involve	 in	 the	 estimation	 of	 values	 for	 the	parameter	that	controls	the	number	of	outliers	within	the	boundary.	The	accuracy	of	SVM-based	one-class	classifiers	is	very	sensitive	to	a	slight	change	in	the	value	of	these	parameters.	
6. Conclusion	and	Future	Work	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 have	 applied	 different	 one-class	 classification	 techniques	 for	detection	 of	 malicious	 IP	 flows.	 The	 techniques	 include	 density	 estimation,	reconstruction	methods,	and	boundary	methods.	We	used	a	flow-based	dataset	to	train	the	one-class	classifiers	on	malicious	IP	flows	and	evaluated	trained	classifier	on	a	test	dataset	containing	both	normal	and	malicious	IP	flow	records.	We	have	used	multiple	
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performance	 measures	 including	 Area	 under	 ROC	 curve	 (AUC)	 and	 F1	 score	 for	comparison	 of	 results.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 results,	 we	 discussed	 pros	 and	 cons	 of	 all	techniques	used	for	one-class	classification.	The	results	show	that	boundary	methods	i.e.	SVM-based	one-class	classifiers	give	higher	accuracy	in	identification	of	malicious	IP	flows.	We,	therefore,	consider	SVM-based	one-classification	techniques	suitable	for	detection	of	malicious	IP	flows	on	the	basis	of	experimental	results.	In	 future,	 our	 focus	 will	 be	 on	 implementing	 a	 multi-stage	 intrusion	 detection	system	using	SVM-based	one-class	classifier	at	 the	 first	stage.	The	second	stage	will	classify	 IP	 flows	 into	 different	 attack	 categories	 and	 provide	 deep	 insight	 into	 the	malicious	 traffic.	 Another	 point	 of	 interest	 will	 be	 to	 combine	 multiple	 one-class	classifiers	for	improvement	in	performance.	Use	of	unsupervised	learning	for	one-class	classification	is	also	a	promising	research	area.	
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